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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,
:

Case No.

-vs:

JON C. VASILACOPULOS,
:

PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION
NO. 13

Defendant-Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in holding that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion
to withdraw his guilty pleas to three felony by deception counts?
A.

Did the record as a whole demonstrate the trial

court's compliance with Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Utah Code Ann. Section 77-35-ll(e)) when it accepted
defendant's pleas to three felony counts of theft by deception?
B.

Did the defendant's request for concurrent

sentences at the sentencing hearing and his extensive delay in
raising the Rule 11 argument demonstrate that the defendant
understood the consecutive sentence possibility at the time he
entered his pleas to three felony counts of theft by deception?

C.

Did the defendant satisfy his burden of showing

good cause why he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty
pleas?
D.

Did the Court of Appeals misinterpret and misapply

this Court's Rule 11(e) precedents?
COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION
The Court of Appeals' opinion, of which petitioner
State of Utah seeks review, is State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d
92 (Utah App. 1988) .
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioner State of Utah seeks review of the Utah Court
of Appeals' decision entered June 3, 1988.
for Rehearing was denied July 19, 1988.

The State's Petition

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(5).
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The controlling statutory provisions are reproduced in
full in the Appendix to this Petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a criminal case.

The defendant was charged

with second degree felony theft on November 13, 1981 (R. 67).
The Information was subsequently amended, charging the defendant
with 20 felony counts of theft by deception (R. 81-86).

The

defendant pleaded guilty to three of those counts on February 17,
1984.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURTS
Following defendant's plea but before sentencing,
defendant fled from Utah, and was arrested on August 5, 1985 (R.
156).

He was sentenced on August 12, 1985, to serve consecutive

terms of incarceration in the Utah State Prison (R. 157).
Defendant moved for reconsideration of his sentence in
November, 1985 (R. 168-169), but did not assert any failure of
the trial court nor request to withdraw his pleas of guilty at
that time.

He petitioned for habeas corpus relief in June, 1986

(R. 2-10 [V v. D]), for resentencing in February, 1987 (R. 202207), and filed a Motion to Withdraw his plea in September, 1987
(R. 345-424).

Each of these motions or petitions was denied or

dismissed by the trial court (R. 185, 199-204 [V v. D], 325 and
455).
The defendant failed to assert that he entered his plea
involuntarily as a result of lack of information until the habeas
corpus petition of June 1986, more than two years after his
guilty plea in February, 1984.

The record in this case was not fully designated by the
defendant and a supplemental designation was required (R. 4 72473). A portion of that supplemented record was renumbered,
rather than continuing with the next number from the original
record. Citations to the record such as (R. 2-10 [V v. D]) mean
that portion of the record consisting of a folder designed
Vasilacopulos v. Deland pages 1-225 and three transcript folders
designated pages 226, 227 and 228 respectively. All other record
designations without the [V v. D] indication are to the remainder
of the record consisting of R. 1-473.

_**_

The defendant appealed the trial court's ruling and on
June 3, 1988, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas,
vacated the defendant's convictions and remanded the case to the
trial court.

The State's Petition for Rehearing was denied on

July 19, 1988, and the Court of Appeals issued an Order for Stay
of Remittitur on July 21, 1988.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant, Jon C. Vasilacopulos, was charged with
second degree felony theft on November 13, 1981 (R. 67). The
Information was subsequently amended, charging the defendant in
the Second Amended Information with twenty counts of theft by
deception (R. 81-86).
Preliminary hearing was held in Fifth Circuit Court on
November 22 and 30, 1982 and January 31, February 2, May 16 and
17, 1983.

Defendant was represented by counsel throughout his

preliminary hearing and was bound over for trial in Third
District Court (R. 5-6) on 18 of the 20 theft by deception counts
(R. 92). Defendant was arraigned on July 18, 1983, and through
counsel received a copy of the "complaint", waived reading
thereof, and entered a plea of not guilty to the 18 counts of
theft by deception (R. 92).
The defendant appeared before the trial court on
February 17, 1984, and entered pleas of guilty to Counts 6, 9,
and 13 of the Second Amended Information (R. 93).

At the time of the plea, the defendant and his counsel
Ronald J. Yengich, executed an "Affidavit of Defendant," waiving
constitutional rights, acknowledging guilt and affirming the
voluntariness of the Defendant's plea of guilty (R. 109-110).
Subsequently, the defendant was uncooperative with
Adult Probation and Parole investigators who reported him as
missing two appointments for psychological evaluations and
failing to make himself available for further interviews with the
investigator preparing the presentence report (R. 114),
necessitating a continuance of the sentencing (R. 115).
Defendant failed to appear for sentencing, and on
October 3, 1984, a no-bail bench warrant was issued for the
arrest of the defendant (R. 118-119, 123). The defendant was
arrested on August 5, 1985, nearly 18 months after his plea of
guilty (R. 156).
On August 12, 1985, the defendant was sentenced (R.
157-159).

Defendant's sentences on the three counts to which he

pleaded guilty were ordered by the Court to run consecutively (R.
157-159 and R. 342, p. 8).
On November 14, 1985, the defendant asked the trial
court to reconsider his consecutive sentences and modify them to
run concurrently.

No mention was made in this motion about

withdrawal of his plea, or that he had entered his plea
involuntarily or without adequate information (R. 168-169).

This

Motion was supplemented on February 5, 1986, with information
regarding the defendant's activities at the Utah State Prison (R.

171-181) # but again contained no claim of involuntariness or lack
of information concerning that plea.

This motion was denied

March 28, 1986. (R. 185).
On June 18, 1986, the defendant filed a habeas corpus
petition in Third District Court asking for post conviction
relief from his guilty plea (R. 2-10 [V v. D]), for the first
time asserting his lack of an informed plea.

This petition was

dismissed without prejudice on September 10, 1987, the trial
court ruling that the defendant had not exhausted his available
remedies. (R. 202 [V v. D]).
The defendant, appearing pro se, filed a Motion for
Resentencing on February 24, 1987 (R. 202-206), more than three
years after his plea of guilty.

The defendant claimed that Rule

11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure had been violated
and that he was not fully aware of the consequences of a plea of
guilty (R. 277-279).

This Motion was denied on May 1, 1987 (R.

325).
Subsequently, the defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw
his guilty plea on September 15, 1987 (R. 345-424).

This motion

was denied by the Court on October 2, 1987 (R. 455). Defendant's
appeal to the Court of Appeals followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A Writ of Certiorari should be granted pursuant to Rule
43(2) of the Rules of this Court inasmuch as the decision of the
Court of Appeals is in conflict with the holdings of this Court.
The facts of the case when viewed in their totality demonstrate

that the defendant was fully aware of the consequences of his 3
pleas of guilty to the felony theft by deception charges.

Those

facts also show that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas.
ARGUMENT
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS MISINTERPRETED
AND MISAPPLIED THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS
IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-13-6 provides:
A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time
prior to conviction. A plea of guilty . . . may be
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of
court. (Emphasis added.)
Obviously a request to withdraw a plea of guilty is not
automatically or mandatorily granted, but is granted only upon a
showing of good cause and with leave of the court.

This Court

has held that Utah Code Ann. Section 77-13-6 permits the trial
court to exercise its sound discretion when ruling upon attempts
by defendants to withdraw their guilty pleas.
This Court recently addressed this issue in State v.
Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422 (Utah 1987):
We will not interfere with a trial judge's
determination that a defendant has failed to show good
cause unless it clearly appears that the trial judge
abused his discretion. State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337,
339 (Utah 1977). We find no abuse of discretion here.
Defendant has failed to show good cause why the court
should have exercised its discretion to allow
withdrawal of the plea. Defendant entered his guilty
plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently and with
the advice of counsel.
Id. at 424.

This Court in State v. Forsyth, supra, said:

-7_

We recognize, of course, that it is the duty of
the trial court to see that the interests of justice
are served by not allowing a person to enter a plea of
guilty to a crime he has not committed. In performing
that duty, the court is not bound to any rigidity of
rule or procedure, but may do it in any manner
consistent with reason and fairness which he thinks
will best accomplish that purpose.
Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
This Court also addressed this issue in State v. Yeck,
566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977);
Once a plea of guilty is knowingly and voluntarily
entered, there are no issues for trial. Where, as
here, the plea of guilty is entered apparently in a
plea bargaining deal, there is no compelling reason to
permit it to be withdrawn by the accused. It is a
matter lying entirely within the discretion of the
trial court and the denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea will be reversed on appeal only when an
abuse of discretion is shown on the part of the trial
jud^e.
Id. at 1249 (emphasis added).
The facts surrounding the defendant's pleas of guilty
demonstrate that they were knowingly and voluntarily entered, and
that the defendant understood the consequences of his pleas of
guilty.

Further, the defendant failed to show why the denial of

his Motion to Withdraw was an abuse of discretion.
On February 17, 1984, the defendant appeared with
counsel before the Court to enter his pleas of guilty.

He

pleaded guilty to Counts 6, 9, and 13 of the Second Amended
Information (R. 93). This guilty plea is set forth at R. 340,
the twelve-page transcript of the entry of the plea.
The transcript of the February 17, 1984, hearing
demonstrates substantial compliance by the trial court at the

time of receipt of defendant's guilty plea with the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-35-ll(e) (Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure) and Rule 3.6 of the Rules of Practice of
District and Circuit Courts, set forth in the Appendix.
The Court of Appeals' decision reversing the
Defendant's convictions was based on their determination that the
trial court did not find that the defendant understood the
possibility of consecutive sentences.
However, the Affidavit signed by defendant indicates in
a number of places his complete understanding of the
ramifications of his plea.

For example, this statement is from

the beginning of the Affidavit (R. 109-110):
My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made.
I am represented by Attorney Ron Yengich and Steve
McCaughey who has explained my rights to me and I
understand them.
Paragraph 8 of the same Affidavit provides:
I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of
guilty does not mean that the Judge will not impose
either a fine or sentence of imprisonment upon me and
no promises have been made to me by anyone as to what
the sentence will be. (Emphasis added.)
Paragraph 10 of the Affidavit provides:
I have read this Affidavit, or I have had it read
to me by my attorney, and I know and understand its
contents. I am 26 years of age, have attended school
through the High School and I can read and understand
the English language.
The fact that the defendant had counsel at the time of
his plea has been held to be a significant factor when
considering whether the trial court has abused its discretion in

refusing to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea.

In

Guqlielmetti v. Turner, 496 P.2d 261 (Utah 1972), this Court
ruled on a claim by the defendant that his guilty plea had not
been voluntary.

The Court rejected this claim and held:

He was represented by one of the foremost
attorneys in the practice of criminal law in this
state, and when a defendant enters a plea of guilty
upon the advice of a competent attorney, the plea is
deemed to be intelligently entered.
Id. at 262. The Court also observed:
This appellant knew full well that a prison
sentence was a possibility when he entered his plea of
guilty to the charge against him, and it is
inconceivable that he was not advised by his lawyer
what the consequences of the plea might be.
Id. at 263.
The circumstances set forth in Guglielmetti, supra, are
consistent with the facts in this case.

The defendant was

represented by two of the foremost attorneys in the practice of
criminal law in the state and it is inconceivable that the
defendant was not advised what the consequences of the plea might
be.
The holding in Guqlielmetti, supra, has been cited with
approval by this Court in Lindeman v. Morris, 641 P.2d 133 (Utah
1982), and Moxley v. Morris, 655 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982).

In the

Lindeman case, the Court said:
The validity of the plea is further bolstered by
the appellant's acknowledgment that it was decided upon
with the full advice of competent counsel.
Id. at 135.

The defendant executed a Memorandum Agreement (R. 103108), which became incorporated in the plea Affidavit (R. 109110).

The following appears on the first page of the Agreement

(R. 103):
The State of Utah, by and through . . . and the
defendant with the advice and agreement of counsel
Ronald J. Yengich and Stephen R. McCaughey, hereby
agree on certain conditions for the guilty pleas by
defendant . . . . (Emphasis added.)
This advice, together with the defendant's execution of
the Affidavit (R. 109-110) and the trial court's thorough
questioning of the defendant at the time he pleaded guilty (R.
340), demonstrates that the defendant was fully informed of the
nature of the charges against him, and of the consequences of his
plea.
If the defendant had any questions or misunderstandings
about any aspect of the plea, he failed to raise them at the time
of his plea.
As noted above, the defendant failed to appear at his
scheduled sentencing (R. 118-119, 123), and was arrested on
August 5, 1985, nearly 18 months after his guilty plea (R. 156).
At the time of sentencing on August 12, 1985, the
defendant's attorney indicated that the presentence report
recommended consecutive sentences (R. 342, pp. 2-3) and the State
recommended the imposition of consecutive sentences (R. 342, p.
5).

When the defendant spoke in his own behalf at sentencing,

after hearing these recommendations, he had no questions or
comments regarding sentencing (R. 342, p. 6). Additionally, the
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defendant obviously would have had access to the presentence
report, yet made no reference in his comments nor asked any
questions to the court about consecutive sentencing.
With respect to the question of consecutive sentences,
paragraph 7 of the Affidavit read as follows:
I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or
awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I
have been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my
plea in the present action may result in consecutive
sentences being imposed on me.
It might be argued that paragraph 7 is not applicable
to the circumstances of defendant's pleas.

Nevertheless,

paragraph 7 does discuss the possibility of consecutive
sentences, the defendant did plead guilty to multiple offenses
and he has failed to explain why, if he was really unaware of the
possibility of consecutive sentences# he failed to ask any
questions about it at the time of the plea or at the time of
sentencing.

In fact, the transcript of the plea makes clear that

defendant understood the Affidavit.

At page 6 (R. 340), the

following exchange took place:
THE COURT: And do you understand the contents of
that document?
MR. VASILACOPULOS: Yes, I do.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the defendant
understood the ramifications of his guilty plea.

He has not

demonstrated good cause why the trial court should have granted
his Motion to Withdraw his guilty pleas or that in refusing to do
so the court abused its discretion.

This Court has previously addressed the question of an
assertion by a defendant that he was not fully advised of his
rights at the time of plea.

The Supreme Court in Warner v.

Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985), and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d
310 (Utah 1985), held that precision was not required by the
Court when complying with Rule 11(e).

The Court in Warner, supra

held:
We find no merit to petitioner's claim. The trial
judge followed the litany required by Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure 11(e). U.C.A., 1953, 77-35-11 (1982
ed.), except that in his question and answer session
with petitioner, he did not ask specifically whether
petitioner was aware that he had a right against
compulsory self-incrimination, as required by Rule
11(e)(3). Petitioner argues that this omission
rendered his plea involuntary under Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 (1969). Although the letter of Rule 11
was not complied with, we find that the record as a
whole affirmatively establishes that petitioner entered
his plea with full knowledge and understanding of its
consequences and of the rights he was waiving,
including his right against self-incrimination. Id. at
310 (emphasis added).
While the Morris case only specifically addresses the
self-incrimination issue, the principle should also hold true in
the context of defendant's claims.

As is clear from the

transcripts and affidavit involving his pleas, the record as a
whole establishes that the defendant entered his plea with full
knowledge of its consequences, including the possibility of
consecutive sentences.
This Court reaffirmed its holdings in Brooks and
Warner, supra, in State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah 1986).
Court said:

* ^

The

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to allow him to withdraw his
guilty plea since he did not understand the nature of
the charges against him or the consequences of his
plea. In accepting a guilty plea, the court should
find -[t]hat the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which he is entering the
plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements.M U.C.A., 1953, 77-53-11(e)(4). In
its memorandum decision denying defendant's motion, the
court acknowledged it did not make a specific finding
to this effect at the time the plea was accepted. We
have held that the absence of a finding under this
section [77-35-11(e)(4)] is not critical so long as the
record as a whole affirmatively establishes that the
defendant entered his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences and of the rights he
was waiving. Brooks v. Morris, Utah, 709 P.2d 310
(1985); Warner v. Morris, Utah, 709 P.2d 309 (1985).
In the instant case, defendant has not supplied us with
a transcript of the arraignment hearing where he
entered his guilty plea or with any other evidence that
the court failed to fully explain the consequences of
the plea. If an appellant fails to provide an adequate
record on appeal, this Court must assume the regularity
of the proceedings below. State v. Robbins, Utah, 709
P.2d 771 (1985); State v. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263
(1982).
Id. at 405.
Again, while the Miller case did not deal specifically
with the consecutive sentence issue, its reasoning is nonetheless
applicable to the case before the Court.
The defendant has cited State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309
(Utah 1987) as supporting his claim that his guilty pleas were
improperly received by the trial court.

That case did not

overrule Miller, Warner or Brooks, supra regarding the record as
a whole test to be applied in such cases, nor did it overrule
Forsyth, supra, holding that no rigidity of rule is required, nor

the Guglielmetti line of cases, supra, emphasizing the presumed
voluntariness of a guilty plea given with the advice of counsel.
There is no indication that it purports to set forth a
new standard or that it overruled past cases on the same subject,
2
i.e., receipt and withdrawal of guilty pleas.
This becomes more evident in examining a holding of
this Court since Gibbons.

The Court in State v. Mildenhall,

supra, held that the defendant had failed to show good cause why
the trial court should have exercised its discretion to allow a
withdrawal of the plea, and reaffirmed State v. Forsyth, supra,
which stated that the court would not interfere with the

trial

court's ruling unless such abuse of discretion was shown, and
that no rigidity of rule or procedure is required.
Nevertheless, the procedure followed in taking the
defendant's guilty pleas in this case was consistent with the
holding in Gibbons.
As noted by the Court in Gibbons, supra, the burden of
establishing that Rule 11(e) is complied with and that the
accused understands the plea procedure and its consequences is on
the trial judge, who may meet this burden by the use of an
affidavit signed by the defendant detailing his understanding of
the plea, and/or by questioning the defendant.
Evaluation of compliance with Rule 11(e) calls for a
review of the entire record.

Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309

2
Williams v. Public Service Commission, 754 P.2d 41, 49, n.9
(Utah 1988).
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(Utah 1985); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985); State v.
Miller, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah 1986); and State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d
337 (Utah 1977).

In this case, the facts that Rule 11(e) was

complied with and that defendant understood the plea process are
demonstrated by reference to the plea affidavit, the transcript
of the conversations between the trial judge and the defendant at
the time the plea was entered and at the sentencing hearing, and
by the defendant's extensive delay in even raising the issue.
As indicated in the Statement of the Facts, the
defendant failed to raise the claim of an allegedly involuntary,
uninformed plea until June of 1986 in his habeas corpus civil
action (R. 2-10 [V v. D]), more than two years after his guilty
plea in February of 1984.
Defendant's belated attempt to withdraw his guilty plea
is obviously an afterthought borne of dissatisfaction with the
court's sentence.

This is not sufficient cause to warrant a

finding of an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

While it

is true that Utah Code Ann. Section 77-13-6 sets no time limit on
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, an undue delay in bringing
such a motion should not be permitted.

But cf. State v.

Jaramillo, 481 P.2d 394 (Utah 1971).
The issues of undue delay and its resultant prejudice
were discussed by this Court in State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah
1986) where this Court held:
If we were to hold that any violation of Rule 11
automatically voids the resultant plea, even when the
plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would
encourage defendants, convicted and sentenced after
such a plea, to attack their convictions for purely

tactical reasons, either by direct appeal or by seeking
habeas corpus long after the fact. We have refused to
overturn convictions upon such challenges in the past,
e.g.. State v. Knowles, Utah, 709 P.2d 311 (1985U
State v. Morris, Utah, 709 P.2d 310 (1985), [sic]3 and
we find no reason to encourage such attacks in the
future.
Overturning such convictions . . . would require
the State to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably
long after the challenged guilty pleas were entered and
when the passage of time would make reprosecution
impractical, if not impossible. Almost certainly, the
ultimate result would be to free a number of convicted
persons for nothing more than technical errors in the
acceptance of their voluntary guilty pleas.
Having concluded that violations of Rule 11 do not
automatically invalidate Kay's guilty pleas, the
question arises as to the consequences of Rule 11
violations. Rule 30 of Utah's Rules of Criminal
Procedure, U.C.A., 1953, S 77-35-30(a) (Repl. Vol. 8C,
1982), reflects our "harmless error" rule, and we find
it applicable to situations involving violations of
Rule 11. Accordingly, a Rule 11 error will not
invalidate the plea taken unless the error results in a
substantial violation of a party's rights.
Id. at 1301-1302.

(Emphasis added.)

Such are the circumstances in this case.

The offenses

to which the defendant pleaded guilty occurred in 1981.

To now

require the State to reprosecute this case might be impractical
and impossible.

The extensive delay in raising the issue of an

uninformed and involuntary plea has never been addressed by the
defendant and the Court of Appeals did not address the question
in its opinion.
The analysis applied by this Court in Kay, supra, is
applicable to the facts of this case with respect to the issue of
It is believed that the Court meant to cite Warner v. Morris,
709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985) and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah
1985) since those cases refer to the withdrawal of guilty pleas
and those cases actually cited do not.
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harmless error.

As this Court observed in that case, Rule 30 of

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to situations
involving violations of Rule 11 of those rules, and a plea will
not be invalidated unless the error results in a substantial
violation of a party's rights.
Assuming arguendo that the trial court did not, to use
this Court's language in State v. Forsyth, apply Rule 11 with
"rigidity of rule or procedure," the totality of the
circumstances nevertheless demonstrates that the rights of the
defendant were not substantially violated and his pleas of guilty
should not be disturbed.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals suggested that
they were not applying the "new" standards the Court of Appeals
found this Court established in Gibbons but a less strict
standard as represented by Warner, Brooks and Miller, supra.
The Court of Appeals said:
. . . [I]n State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah
1987), the Utah Supreme Court without acknowledging
Warner, Brooks or Miller, effectively replaced the
prior "record as a whole" test with a strict Rule 11(e)
compliance test in accepting a defendant's guilty plea.
. . . In the instant case, defendant entered his
plea on February 17, 1984. Therefore the strict Rule
11(e) compliance standard established under Gibbons in
1987 does not apply.
Id. at 94.
While this reading of Gibbons by the Court of Appeals
seems unduly rigid, particularly in light of this Court's
subsequent holding in Mildenhall, supra, what is more troubling
about the Court of Appeals' opinion is that while purporting to

apply a "record as a whole" test, the Court of Appeals in fact
applied a rigid, mechanical, unyielding test of Rule 11(e).

The

court held that the trial court failed to find that the defendant
understood the possibility of consecutive sentences without
acknowledging defendant's extensive delay in raising the 11(e)
challenge, and without recognizing the advice of defendant's
attorney and his argument at the sentencing hearing which
clearly reflected defendant's awareness of the concurrent
sentencing possibility.

Indeed, the court's opinion gives only

perfunctory mention of the sentencing hearing and presentence
report, both of which clearly referred to the concurrent
sentencing possibility.
CONCLUSION
This Court in State v. Plum, 378 P.2d 671 (Utah 1963)
set forth the standard which those seeking to upset a guilty plea
must meet:
[T]he sentence in a criminal case is a final
judgment and one who would set aside such a final
order, must proceed as the attacker and has the burden
of producing convincing proof of a fact which
constitutes a legal ground for setting aside such
sentence. The presumption of validity is strong.
Id. at 671-672.

The Court also said in ruling on defendant's

motion to withdraw his guilty plea:
It has not been made to appear that the accused
entered his plea of guilty in ignorance of his rights,
or that he was immature or illiterate, or that he was
influenced unduly or improperly either by hope or fear,
or that his plea was entered by reason of mistake,
misapprehension or undue influence. And, it appearing
that the motion was not supported by any allegations of
fact the effect of which dictated that the trial court

was required, as a matter of law, to grant the motion,
we are led to the inexorable conclusion that no abuse
of discretion has been shown.
^d. at 673.
The defendant likewise in this case has failed to show
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea under Utah Code Ann. Section 77-13-6.
The Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the law in
this case and did so in conflict with the decisions of this
Court.
The issues raised in this Petition are of considerable
importance to the question of withdrawal of guilty pleas, and
Plaintiff-Petitioner State of Utah respectfully urges this Court
to issue a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.
DATED t h i s

1 *Hw day of
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, 1988.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
STEPHEN J. SORENSON
Chief, Litigation Division
Assistant Attorney General
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AssistcHo/t Attorney General
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APPENDDCA

Acceptance of Mr. Carlton's own values
reveals no serious inequity or abuse of
discretion in the property distribution as
far as he is concerned Although Mrs.
Carlton might have some reason to complain, she has not cross-appealed to challenge the trial court's award.1 The findings show that the trial court considered
each item of property. The premarital
property was delineated and awarded respectively to each party. Hers was assigned a total value; his was not Individual valuations of their premarital assets
were not material since the ultimate issue
was the equitable division of marital property, not premarital property.

mer F. Wilkinson, J., was denied motion to
withdraw guilty plea. The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that record did not
establish that defendant understood possibility of consecutive sentences when he entered plea of guDty.

Where the asset values claimed by appellant at trial show he received an equitable
share of the marital property and no clear
abuse of discretion is otherwise proven, we
ought to defer to the trial court's property
distribution. The judgment of the trial
court should be affirmed.

2. Criminal Law *~273.1(4)
Trial court may not rely on defense
counsel or executed affidavits to satisfy
specific requirements of admonishing defendant before accepting plea of guilty.
U.CJL1953, 77-35-ll(e).

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Jon C VASILACOPULOS, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 870291-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 3, 1988.
Rehearing Denied July 19, 1988.
Defe* dant appealed from order of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, HoS. The property distribution is also eminently
fair when reviewed on the basis of marital Income. The majority identifies a seven year
marriage and acknowledges thai Mr. Carlton
"earned over J100,000 00 gross annual income
during most of the marriage." Their tas returns
show trial his adjusted gross income ranged
from a high of $117,000 to a low of 1&S.000.
The parties maintained a frugal lifestyle, eaxept
for regular business trips that were expensed
through his CPA business. Most of the approsj*

Reversed, convictions vacated, and
matter remanded

1. Criminal Law *=»1149
Denial of motion to withdraw guilty
plea will be reversed only when it dearly
appears that the trial court has abused its
discretion. U.CA.1953, 77-13-6.

J. Courts *»100(1).
Where defendant entered his guilty
plea prior to date of Supreme Court decision requiring strict compliance with admonition requirements, the strict compliance
standard did not apply and test for reviewing efficacy of plea hearing was whether
the record as a whole affirmatively established that defendant entered his plea with
knowledge and understanding of its consequences. U.CJL1953, 77-35-ll(e).
4. Criminal Law *»273.1(4)
Defendant's statement that he had
gone over affidavit with his attorney and
understood the contents of that guilty plea
affidavit and that he understood that be
was waiving his right to trial, to confront
witnesses, and to appeal to a higher court
did not establish that defendant understood
mately $700,000 of income earned during the
marriage was invested in liquid assets. The
court found an accumulation of only $223,000.
I find it Inconceivable that the remaining $472."
000 of income was spent by these two people for
consumables during their short marriage. Mrs.
Carlton was awarded no alimony. Her $114,000 property award, about which she has pot
complained, appears fair, equitable and even
generous to Mr. Carlton's side of the ledger.

D I A T E v. VASILACOPULOS
QUUTM rod n (vtMhApv iwi)

poasibQity of consecutive sentences, and
guilty plea was thus bvalid. U.C.A.1953,
77-85-11(6).
James N. Barber (argued), Salt Lake
City, for defendant and appellant
David L Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Stephen
J. Sorensen, Asst Atty. Gen., Stanley H.
Olsen (argued), Asst Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent
Before BENCH, DAVIDSON and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Defendant Jon VasOacopulos appeals
from a trial court's denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. We reverse and
remand.
Defendant was charged by amended information with twenty felony counts of
theft by deception, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 7G-&-405 (1978). A preliminary bearing was held and defendant was
bound over for trial on eighteen of the
twenty counts. On February 17, 1984, defendant entered a guilty plea to three of
the felony counts, one second degree and
two third degree, based on a memorandum
agreement that the remaining counts
would be dismissed and sentencing would
be delayed until August 1984. Defendant
executed an affidavit waiving his rights,
acknowledging his guilt, and affirming the
voluntariness of his plea. Defendant failed
to appear for sentencing. The trial court
issued a bench warrant, and one year later
defendant was arrested. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of incarceration for the three felonies and a total fine
of $20,000.
Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence in November 1985, a petition for habeas corpus relief in June 1986,
a motion for resentencing in February
1987, and a motion to withdraw his plea in
September 1987. The court denied his motions and dismissed his petition. Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the trial
court's denial of his motion for resentenc-
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ing, a petition for writ of mandamus, and a
notice of appeal from the court's denial of
his motion to withdraw his plea. The three
actions were consolidated for appeal by order of this Court
(1] On appeal, defendant claims his
guilty plea was involuntary and improperly
taken by the trial court, and, therefore, the
trial court erred in denying his motion to
withdraw his plea. Utah Code Ann.
{ 77-13-6 (1982) states, in part, "A plea of
guilty . . . may be withdrawn only upon
good cause shown and with leave of court."
The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea will be reversed only when it clearly
appears the trial court has abused its discretion. Stale v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422
(Utah 1987).
Defendant argues the trial court abused
its discretion by failing to comply with
Utah R.Crim.P. 11(e) (Utah Code Ann.
% 77-S5^11(e) (19B7)). Rule 11(e) states:
The court . . . shall not accept [a plea of
guilty] untD the court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel he has knowingly
waived his right to counsel and does
not desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury* trial and to confront
and cross-examine in open court the
witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all of those

rights;
(4) That the defendant understands
the nature and elements of the offense
to which he is entering the plea; that
upon trial the prosecution would have
the burden of proving each of those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt;
and that the plea is an admission of all
those elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence that may
be imposed upon him for each offense
to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; and
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(6) Whether the tendered plea U a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement and if so, what agreement
has been reached.
See also R.Prmc.DisLCir.Cta. 3.6. Defendant claims the trial court failed to find he
understood the nature and elements of the
offenses and the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences, in violation
of subsections 4 and 5 of Rule 11(e).
In the companion eases of Warner v.
Morris, 709 P.2d 809 (Utah 1985), and
Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah
1985), the trial courts substantially followed the litany required by Rule 11(e). In
Homer, however, the court failed to ask
defendant whether he was aware he had a
right against compulsory self-incrimination.
Similarly, in Brooks the court failed to ask
defendant whether he understood he was
waiving his right against self-incrimination.
In both cases, the Utah Supreme Court
held, "Although the letter of Rule 11 was
not complied with, we find that the record
as a whole affirmatively establishes that
defendant entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences and of the rights he was waiving....Warner, 709 P.2d at 310;
Brooks, 709 P.2d at 311. The Court reaffirmed its decisions in Warner and
Brooks in State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403
(Utah 1986).
(2) Subsequently, in State v. Gibbons,
740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court, without acknowledging Warner, Brooks, or Miller, effectively replaced
the prior "record as a whole'9 test with a
strict Rule 11(e) compliance test in accepting a defendant's guilty plea. In Gibbons,
the Court remanded defendant's appeal of
his guilty plea as defendant had failed to
first file a motion to withdraw his plea,
thereby disallowing the trial court the opportunity to address an alleged error.
However, the Court retained jurisdiction
over the case for any necessary future
action and utilized the opportunity to issue
"a statement of law concerning the taking
of guilty pteas in all trial courts in this
state...." Id at 1311 In its statement
of law, the Gibbons Court held, "Rule 11(e)

squarely places on trial courts the burden
of ensuring that constitutional and Rule
11(e) requirements are complied with when
a guilty plea is entered." Id Trial courts
may not rely on defense counsel or executed affidavits to satisfy the specific requirements of Rule 11(e). Id. at 1313.
Rather, with or without an affidavit or
defense counsel's advice, the trial court
must conduct an on-the-record review with
defendant of the Rule 11(e) requirements.
Id at 1314.
(3) In the instant case, defendant entered his plea on February 17, 1984.
Therefore, the strict Rule 11(e) compliance
standard established under Gibbons in
1987 does not apply. See United Slates v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct 2579, 73
LEd.2d 202 (1982); State v. Norton, 675
P.2d 577 (Utah 1983) (when a new rule of
criminal procedure constitutes a clear
break with the past, it will not be applied
retroactively). Rather, we will apply the
Warner-Brooks test to determine whether
the record as a whole affirmatively establishes defendant entered his plea with fuO
knowledge and understanding of its consequences, namely the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences.
[4] At defendant's change of plea hearing, the trial court reviewed with defendant
that upon his plea of guilty to three counts,
the prosecution would dismiss the remaining counts at the time of sentencing. The
following exchange then occurred:
la that your intent, air?
Yes, Hia.
Now have you gone over an affidavit
with your attorney?
Yes, I have.
And do you understand the contents of
that document?
Yea, I do.
And do you understand if you sign that
you will be pleading guQty, as I have
indicated to you?
Yta
You also understand that if you sign that
you will be waiving your right to a trial,
your right to confront the witnesses,
your right to appeal to a higher court?

ANDERSON r. BJUNKERHOFF

Utah

95

Ote • • 756 T2d 95 CUtmb App. 19S8)

Yes.
You also understand that if you were to
go to trial in this matter you would not
be compelled to take the witness stand
and testify?
Yes, I do.
Are you presently under the influence of
any type of alcohol or medication or narcotics that would impair your ability to
exercise your free consent?
No, I am not
Are you doing this of your own free will
and consent?
Yes, I am.
Do you understand that these other
counts, which I have read to you, will not
be dismissed today, but they will be held
pending until the date of sentencing?
Yes, I do.
How do you plead, sir?
Guilty.
You may proceed and execute your affidavit
The trial court clearly failed to find defendant understood the possibility of consecutive sentences. The state argues the
record as a whole affirmatively establishes
defendant's full awareness of such a possibility. We disagree. The only record evidence the state can marshal for its position
is the pre-sentence report and recommendation submitted at the sentencing hearing
which was held one and one-half years after defendant entered his plea. The record
as a whole supports a conclusion that defendant would only be subject to consecutive sentences under certain conditions.
Paragraph 7 of defendant's affidavit
states, "I also know that if I am on probation parole, or awaiting sentencing upon
another offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have plead [sic] guilty,
my plea in the present action may result in
consecutive sentences being imposed on
me.
We conclude the record as a whole does
not affirmatively establish defendant's full
knowledge and understanding of the consequences of his plea under Rule ll(eX5).
Defendant has therefore satisfied his burden of showing good cause under section
77-1S-6. The trial court abused its discre-

tion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. In light of our conclusion,
We do not reach defendant's other claim
regarding Rule 11(e)(4).
The trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea is reversed. Defendant's convictions are vacatr
ed, and the matter is remanded for further
Proceedings.
DAVIDSON, and JACKSON, JJ.,
concur.
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Mont R. ANDERSON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Cloyd H.
Brinkerhoff, Lena Brinkerhoff, and
Mark J. Brinkerhoff, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Elsie BRINKERHOFF, Golda B. Adair,
Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B. Goulding, and John Does I thru V, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 880122-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 9, 1988.
Purchasers of property brought action
to quiet title and for specific performance
of contract
The Sixth District Court,
Kane County, Don V. Tibbs, J., entered
judgment in favor of purchasers, and appeal followed. The Court of Appeals, BillWigs, J., held that (1) evidence supported
finding that contract for sale of land had
not been abandoned, but rather that vendor
had waived strict compliance with contractual terms; (2) forfeiture provision of cont a c t was not self-executing; and (3) evidence supported finding that subsequent
deeds executed by vendor to other family
Members were invalid because vendor

APPENDIX B

Rule lie

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or not
context and shall not accept such a plea until the court has made
the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by
counsel he has knowingly waived his right to counsel
and does not desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial
and to confront and cross-examine in open court the
witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he
waives all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which he is entering the
plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him for each
offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a
prior plea discussion and plea agreement and if so,
what agreement has been reached•
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any
other party has agreed to request or recommend the
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or
the dismissal of other charges, the same shall be
approved by the court. If recommendations as to
sentence are allowed by the court, the court shall
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation
as to sentence is not binding on the court.

APPENDIX C

Rule 3.6
CIRCUIT COURTS

UTAH RULES OP PRACTICE - DISTRICT AND

Upon entry of a plea of guilty to a criminal charge, before
acceptance thereof, there must be substantial compliance with the
following:
(a) Admonitions to defendant. The court shall
not accept a plea of guilty without first making
certain that the defendant understands the following:
(1) the nature of the charge;
(2) the minimum and maximum sentence
prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the
penalty to which the defendant may be subjected,
including any consecutive sentences, if given;
(3) that the defendant has the right to
plead not guilty, or to persist in that plea if it
ha already been made, or to plead guilty; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty there will not
be a trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty
he waives the right to a trial by jury, the right
to be confronted with the witnesses against him,
the right against self incrimination, and the
right to appeal a conviction.
(b) Determining whether the plea is voluntary.
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty without
first determining that the plea is voluntary. If the
tendered plea is the result of a plea agreement, the
agreement shall be stated and confirmed in open court.
The court shall determine whether any force of threats
or any promises, apart from a plea agreement, were used
to obtain the plea.
(c)
Determining factual basis for plea. The
court shall not enter final judgment on a plea of
guilty without first determining that there is a
factual basis for the plea, and that all requirements
of law for acceptance of a guilty plea have been met.
(d) Use of affidavit of defendant. The court may
establish the foregoing requirements in the record by
use of a written affidavit executed by the defendant
before the court, the substance of which shall be in
substantially the form as contained in the "Affidavit
of Defendant" form.

APPENDIX D

Rule 30

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded,
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts
of the records and errors in the record arising from oversight or
omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such
notice, if any, as the court may order.

APPENDIX E

Rule 43

RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

RULE 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when
there are special and important reasons therefor. The following,
while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be
considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of appeals has rendered
a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of
the Court of Appeals on the same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a
question of state or federal law in a way that is in
conflict with a decision of this court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered
a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for
an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important
question of municipal, state, or federal law which has not
been, but should be, settled by this court. (Emphasis
added.)

APPENDIX F

UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

ORDER
No. 870291-CA

Jon C. Vasilacopulos,
Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for
Rehearing filed by the respondent.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the respondent's petition for
rehearing is denied.
Dated this 19th day of July, 1988.
FOR THE COURT:

ClerJK of the Court

APPENDIX 6

.-»

Rr-'..
•BE J.1 11
DAVID L. WILKINSON - 3472
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division
STANLEY H. OLSEN - 2466
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
I

ORDER FOR STAY OF
REMITTITUR

t

Case No. 870291-CA

Plaintiff-Petitioner,
-vsJON C. VASILACOPULOS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Based upon motion of the State, good cause appearing
therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 36(c) of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, that the remittitur in the
above-entitled case, State v. Vasllacopulos, in which this Court

denied rehearing on July 19, 1988, be stayed for a period of 30
days from the date of this order to allow the State the
opportunity to file its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari before
the Utah Supreme Court.
DATED this

^ I

/
day of

3<^t(A

, 1988.

JUDGE, TJTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY

This is to certify that I hand-delivered a copy of the
foregoing ORDER FOR STAY OF REMITTITUR to the following this 21st
day of July, 19881

JAMES N. BARBER
255 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant Jon C. Vasilacopulos

